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ABSTRACT 
This paper explores the reasons for the failure of local and national leaders to adequately deal 
with the crisis that resulted from Hurricane Katrina September 2005.  It is argued that the 
failure of instrumentality demonstrates alternative management strategies are required.  The 
aesthetic lens offers options that could have helped avoid many of the disastrous 
consequences of the flooding. 
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A TIGER BY THE TAIL: THE ARTISTRY OF CRISIS MANAGEMENT 
In September 2005 when the levies surrounding New Orleans were breaching and the city 
flooded as a result of Hurricane Katrina, questions were asked about the readiness of local 
and federal agencies to deal with a crisis of such an enormous scale.  And yet it was no 
surprise that there was the potential for a hurricane to cause such devastation.  Residents 
along the South East coast of the United States of America (USA) and the Caribbean ready 
themselves year-by-year for what they know as the hurricane season, a long window from 
around June to November where hurricanes form off-shore and track towards land.  Why, 
then, was there such surprise at the devastation wrecked on New Orleans? 
In this paper I propose that an essential element was, and perhaps still is, missing from the 
resource of disaster management strategies.  I argue that the dimension that is absent is the 
aesthetic approach.  Absent from organisational studies until the 1990s, aesthetics has 
primarily been contained almost solely in the arts.  As a branch of philosophy, aesthetics aids 
artists and their audiences to make sense of creative works.  But what is the place of 
aesthetics in the world beyond the erudite world of philosophy?   
Organisational studies have their origins in the notion that scientific rationality and 
instrumentality are sufficient in themselves to successfully manage business enterprises.  This 
has been tempered in recent decades with a focus on ethics as a necessary counterpoint to the 
pure rationality.  However, until recently there has been missing the third element of 
aesthetics (Taylor & Hansen, 2005) in our understanding of organisational life and in 
advancing the project of revitalisation (Casey, 2002).   
Aesthetics as an academic discipline within organisational studies has its origins in disquiet 
concerning the predominance of the scientific view which leaves unnoticed and therefore 
unexamined the symbolic.  Henry Mintzberg, in his ruminations on organisational strategy 
follows an art-making route, deploying the craft of pottery (Mintzberg, 1987) as a preferred 
metaphor.  Several years prior, in 1985, Mintzberg and Westley wrote a short but provocative 
paper entitled ‘Spinning on symbolism: Imagining strategy’ where they advocate a symbolic 
approach to a field that has relied on quantifiably hard data.  Here they take the notion of 
strategy beyond its scientific roots and postulate an artistic perspective – strategy as an 
experience.  Profundity, they suggest, is not found in the rigorous application of concepts and 
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principles, but rather through the imagination.  In making this claim they ask: ‘Can we say 
that organizations rich in tangible imagery are more inclined to pursue more profound, 
creative, individualistic strategies, while those poor in such imagery will pursue superficial 
banal strategies?’ (Mintzberg & Westley, 1985, p. 63).   
Underpinning Mintzberg’s disquiet is that the instrumental focus has its weaknesses and that 
strategy is as much an art as a science (Mintzberg, 1987).  He argues that traditional 
approaches of producing so-called hard data, distorts strategic thinking by removing ‘random 
noise, gossip, inference, impression, and fact’ (Mintzberg, 1994, p. 258) from the frame.   
Almost two decades after their symbolism article, Mintzberg and Westley produced another 
piece in like vein that advocates an artistic approach to planning (Mintzberg & Westley, 
2001).  This kind of intuitive approach to organisational leadership is finding an audience in 
the academy that now values intuition as an important compliment to rationality (Sadler-
Smith & Shefy, 2004). 
These moves in organisational research which embrace process and symbol are gaining a 
home in the aesthetic movement.  Although aesthetics is a philosophical tradition that reaches 
back to the Enlightenment, with antecedents in Greek antiquity, its entrance into 
organisational studies is only recent.  Seminal works such as Antonio Strati’s ‘Aesthetic 
understanding of organizational life’ (Strati, 1992) and Pasquale Gagliardi’s ‘Exploring the 
aesthetic side of organizational life’ (Gagliardi, 1996) advocate for an approach that adds to 
existing frameworks.  They argue that the ephemeral and ineffable can be known and 
explored.   
Further developments in the field have been strengthened by Pierre Guillet de Monthoux in 
his aesthetic analysis of arts organisations (Guillet de Monthoux, 2004), and Steve Taylor’s 
use of aesthetics as a research tool (Taylor, 2002).  In this paper I seek to contribute to these 
developments by offering an analysis of the Katrina crisis taking an aesthetic approach.   
Aesthetics can be defined as ‘sense perception’ (Williams, 1983, p. 31) and necessarily relies 
on an empathy developing between the work of art and the perceiver.  Rather than seeing this 
as fixed and lineal with the perceiver deriving objective data from the subject, an empathic 
connection is fluid and active.   
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Within the organisational arena, the aesthetic view allows for imagination and tacitly-held 
beliefs to be expressed (Adler, 2006, p. 491) thereby complimenting traditional ways of 
knowing and leading. 
Here, then, I adopt the view that instrumentality, ethics and aesthetics are all necessary 
elements that inform management practice.  In his contemplative summary of his academic 
life, Stewart Clegg poses that intellectually he has been informed by all three (Clegg, 2005).  
This in itself should not be surprising; but what is of interest is the equal weight of aesthetics 
with ethics and instrumentality.  This rise of aesthetic awareness in organisational studies, 
then, is rooted in the existential question posed by Michel Foucault, who asked: ‘Couldn’t 
everyone’s life become a work of art?’ (Foucault, 1991, p. 350, emphasis added).  For 
Foucault it is aesthetics, the desire to live a ‘beautiful life’ (Cummings, 2000, p. 220), that 
allows us as individuals to shape our identity, as opposed to rule-bound ethical codes.  By 
implication, then, translating this triad of lenses of instrumentality, ethics and aesthetics into 
organisational studies provides a fuller picture of what is happening within enterprises.   
In this paper I offer a case study of the devastation that hurricane Katrina wrought on New 
Orleans in September 2005.  Underpinning this study is the notion that Foucault’s beautiful 
life translates into management practice, to in essence, manage beautifully.  My claim is that 
the absence of the aesthetic frame from the responses to Katrina and her aftermath can 
account for the inability of leaders at federal, state and city level to act in a timely and 
proactive manner.   
In making these claims it should be noted that I am writing as an outsider.  I am not a citizen 
of the United States of America (USA) and I live in a country some 12,000 kilometres from 
New Orleans.  I observed the management of hurricane Katrina from this distance and as a 
subscriber to Time magazine, have developed my insights from responses to articles in this 
weekly magazine and the daily newspapers in my region.  In summary, I am politically and 
socially non-aligned and my reading of events was based on the question: ‘How would I as an 
aesthetician manage this crisis?’  
However, before exploring the management of the Katrina disaster using the aesthetic frame, 
I will briefly explore the aesthetic concepts that would inform an aesthetician-manager.  To 
do so I will look at aesthetics’ origins and scope some of the elements that convert from 
philosophical concept to practice.  
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AESTHETICS: ORIGINS AND CONCEPTS 
The contemporary study of aesthetics has its origins in early Enlightenment philosophical 
developments.  Most notably, the work of Giambattista Vico and Alexander Gottlieb 
Baumgarten form the basis for aesthetic thinking and these philosophers contested the 
Enlightenment’s privileging of rationality and reason over other forms of knowing.   
Rather than eschewing history, Vico considered past ages to be loaded with significance and 
believed that they could not be discounted simply on the basis of their supposed irrationality.  
As Hampson summarises, Vico’s philology was a quest for ‘the story of the past, [that] 
instead of being an educative manual, in which reason struggled with ignorance and 
superstition … was an account whose meaning lay within itself, in which any period was as 
significant as any other’ (Hampson, 1968/1990, p. 236). 
For Vico, to reject or even discount the past is to fail to see the wealth of ideas and values 
that shed light on the human story.  Therefore, the age of heroes, symbolic language and 
myth, represent the ground for aesthetic theory, for it is in these artefacts the essence of 
human identity is revealed.  Hence mythical awareness, as a counterpoint to the Cartesian 
epistemology of causality, relies on a creative imagination that pauses to tease out meanings 
inherent within a story.   
By rejecting rational exploration that reduces human experience to universal theorems, Vico 
proffers that theorising on human behaviour can be accomplished with immaginazione, an 
imaginative ability to think backwards ‘even across long periods of time’ (Janik, 1983, p. 41), 
in the belief that ‘human action belongs to the sphere of the variable, of becoming rather than 
being’ (Janik, 1983, p. 42, emphasis added).  Therefore, aesthetic inquiry through the 
exploration of myth, heroic poetry and language offers a process of discovery that sees 
human existence as fluid and continually unfolding.   
Organisational aesthetician Antonio Strati concurs, arguing that a transformation occurs with 
myth-making in that ‘people use myth and mythical thinking to identify themselves with the 
things that they do, transforming or translating themselves into these things’ (Strati, 1998, p. 
1389).  Myth-making can enable people to deal with contradiction and anxiety within their 
lives.  For, as Strati provocatively maintains: 
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The mythical thought described by Vico, therefore, is fantasy, metaphor and 
image.  It is a way of seeing and knowing the world that has nothing to do 
with analysis, explanation or reason.  Instead, it involves the construction of 
civil society through the ‘translation’ of people into it, and through its 
adequate understanding ‘from within’.  
(Strati, 1999, p. 153) 
This latter claim provides the key to Vico’s thought, namely, that as we engage with the past 
by examining myths, fables and symbols, we derive the tools of knowing and becoming.  
Further, the resulting personal and social transformation, achieved through aesthetic 
perception, is firstly internal, leading to the external and systemic.   
In concert with Vico, Baumgarten’s perspective can be summed up in the words: 
Aestheticis finis est perfectio cognitionis sensitivae, qua talis.  [The aim of 
aesthetics as a discipline is the development and improvement of the sensitive 
knowledge.] 
(Baumgarten, cited in Gross, 2002, p. 410) 
The implication here is that knowledge gained through the senses augments ‘cognition 
meditated by the intellect’ (Osborne, 1970, p. 175).  Thus Baumgarten applied the term 
gnoseologia inferior (Cassirer, 1944, p. 137) or ‘inferior cognition’ to this acquisition.  
‘Inferior’ here is not to be considered as something lesser; rather it is knowledge that is 
discovered beneath or below that which is immediately available to the intellect through 
logical reasoning – gnoseologia superior.   
Following this line, the challenge is for the perceiver to work with immediate sensation (an 
inferior cognition) and to reflexively connect that with wider human values and behaviour 
(superior cognition).  Therefore, to become a sensitive thinker, alert to both the noble and the 
mundane, Baumgarten claims that a perceiver must become responsive to the object and all 
its attendant elements and contributing parts.  Hence the perceiver is ‘in a continual process 
of developing all his powers and senses, and exploring them in all possible directions’ (Gross, 
2002, p. 412), constantly trying to find new angles from which to view an object.  In 
response, the aesthetician too is in a constant process of development and change in an 
evolving Self-Other relationship.   
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Therefore, thinking aesthetically involves becoming sensitive to richness and complexity, 
with the view to transformation at individual and societal levels.  This sensitivity may include 
putting aside already firmly held beliefs about the way the world operates.  The aesthetician’s 
task is to become comfortable with the chaotic and disorderly and not necessarily attempt to 
resolve these into currently accepted ways of operating.  In this way, beauty and order are 
embraced along with the ugly and confused.  In what follows I conceptualise these notions 
into firstly the relationship between the creative act of presencing and the responsive act of 
concretisation.  I then distil Vico’s and Baumgarten’s ideas into an analytical framework. 
CONCEPTUALISING AESTHETICS  
The work of the two progenitors, Vico and Baumgarten, focuses on qualities such as the 
validity of the imagination, sensation as the ground of knowledge, the necessity of an 
historical view, and the importance of myth.  These ideas form the basis for contemporary 
aesthetics which can be defined as ‘sense perception’ (Williams, 1983, p. 31).  In order to 
make sense of the ephemeral nature of sense and perception, it is perhaps easier to split them 
into the creative act which is derived from the senses and responses to that creativity which 
relies on perception.  Aestheticians understand this as a binary relationship between 
presencing and concretisation.   
Presencing focuses on the act of creation and begins in the imagination.  For instance, an 
artist sets out to paint or make music and this act of creation comes from the creator-artist’s 
imagination, resulting in paint marks on a canvas or sound from the instrument.  Thus a work 
is presenced.   
However, a work of art only comes into existence when its audience interacts with it.  
Therefore, all creative acts require perceivers who concretise the piece by making sense of 
what they see or hear.  Concretisation takes place as people actively engage with a work even 
if that is a mere cursory examination. 
Within the organisational context these notions focus on the work of leaders in their decision 
making.  Decisions are presenced out of the leader’s imagination and are formalised into 
policies that shape responses.  However, the creative act of deciding is not consummated until 
there are actors who can concretise those decisions by enacting them.  Hence, I argue that the 
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way in which leaders presence an idea (by deciding on a course of action) will guide how 
people concretise the decision (by acting on that determination). 
The task of perception, though, requires a framework from which presencing and 
concretisation can occur; a set of concepts that can enable their translation into ways of 
seeing and acting within the organisational context.  The aesthetic view distils the ideas 
derived from Vico and Baumgarten into three elements of form and content, backward 
reflexivity and myth making.   
The aesthetic notions of form and content, that chaotic and disparate elements (form) 
constellate around a structure (form) has been systematised in Gestalt psychology.  By 
attending to the properties of musical melodies, the founders of Gestalt therapy, Christian von 
Ehrenfels and Max Wertheimer considered that the parts and the whole interrelate together.  
For instance a single note within a melody only makes sense within its overall context, and 
yet paradoxically that note may also suggest the entire melody.  
Wertheimer claims that ‘the whole is more than the sum of the parts’ by adding that ‘the 
properties of any parts are determined by the intrinsic structural laws of the whole’ 
(Wertheimer, cited in Brosnan, Scott, Fox, & Pye, 2004, p. 460).  Therefore, the parts and the 
whole work together, so that perceptions of form and content interrelate. 
Antonio Strati (1999) argues similarly, that all human processes revolve around form.  The 
very acts of problem-framing and problem-solving are formative, in that ideas are represented 
in an identifiable shape.  Hence, it is no surprise that Dean, Ottensmeyer and Ramirez argue 
that form is a base element of organisational activity.  
Indeed, we can not even conceive of organizations without evoking form, 
because the very language we use to depict organizational phenomena is full 
of references to form.  We reform institutions, transform work practices, 
enhance or measure performance, formalize procedures, analyze informal 
behavior, formulate strategies, have personnel wear uniforms, fill out forms 
(formulaires in French), and inform people. 
(Dean, Ottensmeyer, & Ramirez, 1997, p. 422) 
Therefore, both form and content work in concert together.  For, to have form with no content 
is akin to music without sound, or a beautifully crafted frame without a painting.  Similarly, 
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content without a formal structure is like a jumble of meaningless sounds or random colours 
splashed on a canvas.  Both form and content are necessary for meaning making.  
The second notion of backward reflexivity also has its origins in musical aesthetics.  
According to the Polish aesthetician Roman Ingarden, listening skills require a ‘backward 
reflex’ (Ingarden, 1986, p. 72) with the perceiver continually referring to the past melodic 
and harmonic ideas within a piece, as reference points for present sound.  To explain this 
aesthetic, Hepburn uses the phrase ‘paradoxical co-presence’ (Hepburn, 2002, p. 27) where 
the present, past, and indeed future, are considered simultaneously.   
This ability for backward thinking assumes that time is not just a lineal succession of acts, but 
that current events have a history.  In its wider context then, the notion of temporality holds 
that there is a difference between ‘physical time and social time’ (Elias, 1992, p. 44) with 
social time being heterogeneous.  Hence thinking about the ‘cyclical and qualitative nature of 
social time’ (Hassard, 1996, p. 586) necessitates not only thinking in anticipation of what is 
to come, but also by retrospectively allowing the past to inform the present.  Hence as time is 
viewed qualitatively, the aesthetician acknowledges that events are interrelated and occur 
within a context.   
The third aesthetic element that underpins my analysis of the Katrina disaster is the idea of 
myth-making.  Here the use of the word myth is defined as ‘ideology in narrative form’ 
(Lincoln, 2006, p. 242).  Myths are therefore part of everyday life and enable us to make 
sense of complex situations by ‘helping us to get beyond the chaotic flux of random events, 
and glimpse the core of reality’ (Armstrong, 2005, p. 7).   
Roland Barthes shows the movement in language analysis from semiotic investigation to 
myth-making, claiming that myth shifts the focus from the micro-analysis of signs and codes 
to more macro-interpretation.  Myths can take the form of words, a photograph, cartoon, an 
action or even a work of art, and generate stories at a meta-level which are at once 
‘anonymous and slippery, fragmented and garrulous’ (Barthes, 1977, p. 166).  Myths shift 
and adapt and through the process of myth-creation, symbols adopt a global meaning that 
suggests meaning beyond the symbol itself. 
How do we read myths?  Barthes suggests that we need to take them as they present 
themselves and look for meaning within them, rather than in the historical context that 
generated the original symbol.  Barthes claims that myth itself is an ‘inextricable whole made 
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of meaning and form, [and] I receive an ambiguous signification: I respond to the constituting 
mechanism of myth, to its own dynamics’ (Barthes, 1972, p. 128).  Myth naturalises images 
by freezing them to the point where they are ‘not read as a motive, but as a reason’ (Barthes, 
1972, p. 129, emphasis added).  In this way, myth extends a symbol giving it a life of its own, 
where the myth itself becomes the tool for making sense of phenomena.   
To summarise, the aesthetic view can be conceptualised with the parts and the whole being 
considered simultaneously as they form into a gestalt; the past and implied future informing 
the present; and myth-making attending to ideology that underpins these conceptualisations.  
To achieve this, organisational actors require an alert imagination and the ability to access 
knowledge at the sensate level, thereby allowing that which is tacitly known to inform 
rationality.  As leaders presence their strategic plans, those charged with enacting decisions 
are able to concretise them with the same degree of imagination.  With these notions as a 
backdrop, I now examine the Katrina disaster.  
KATRINA: WHAT HAPPENED?  
There had been 6 days to prepare for the onslaught of Hurricane Katrina on 29 August 2005.  
A tropical cyclone had formed off the African coast on 23 August and had begun to track 
towards Florida.  The ensuing floods in New Orleans of September 2005 brought human 
devastation unparalleled in the recent history of the USA.  Loss of life, the displacement of 
over 800,000 people, the destruction of property and lost employment, all resulted from the 
disaster; and much of this suffering can be attributed to the inability of managers at federal, 
state and city level to act in a timely manner (White House admits Katrina flaws, 2006).  
Could this destruction and displacement have been avoided?  My claim is ‘yes’, that by 
seeing the crisis through an aesthetic lens, leaders could have acted in such a way as to 
minimise the effects of the disaster.  
In the face of insurmountable problems resulting from the loss of personal resources, the 
people of New Orleans turned to their federal, state and city level leaders to act on their 
behalf.  The floods left multitudes of people homeless and because much of the infrastructure 
had been destroyed, hundreds of thousands were left stranded without the basic necessities of 
water and food.  Financially, the disaster is estimated to have cost in excess of US$100 
billion, including the destruction of infrastructure and disruption to oil production 
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(Lawrimore, 2005).  This desperate situation required leaders who could lobby for immediate 
resources and build morale.   
In this early stage of the crisis, it was the perceptions of these leaders, how they presenced 
the crisis, that determined how the disaster relief operation would unfold, especially in the 
allocation of resources.  These initial reactions were focused on solving the problem of 
property destruction.  Instead of focusing on saving life and rescuing the stranded, state and 
federal leaders perceived property to be of greater value and sought for ways of protecting 
individuals against theft and looting.  In response to this perception, armed soldiers were 
immediately dispatched to the area to guard against the citizenry appropriating goods by 
force.   
This immediate concentration on property resulted in inaction in rescuing and supporting 
stranded people.  Time reporter Amanda Ripley notes that leaders appeared either unwilling 
or unable to act, and ‘the hesitation seemed to start locally and then infect the chain of 
command all the way to Washington’ (Ripley, 2005b, p. 33).  Instead of focusing on the 
immediate needs of victims and seeking ways of alleviating their suffering, the protection of 
the property rights of individuals became a higher priority.  In spite of the thousands sheltered 
in the New Orleans Superdome pleading for relief, ‘looting was seen as a greater risk than 
rising waters, incipient disease, and hunger in the refugee Superdome’ (Hari, 2005, p. A19).  
And yet a month after the disaster struck, fears of widespread anarchy proved to be 
unfounded and no life was lost as a result of the predicted vigilante action (Gumbel, 2005). 
First responses from President George W. Bush also confirmed the view that property 
destruction was a greater danger than the life-threatening situation that was developing.  In 
his comments in the early days of the disaster, he proclaimed that Mississippi’s Republican 
senator Trent Lott’s home would be rebuilt into ‘a fantastic house’ (Cooper, 2005, p. 43) but 
omitted any statement on the re-housing of the many hundreds of thousands of New 
Orleans’s poor displaced by the floods.  Rather than focusing on the needs of the general 
populace, it seemed that national leaders were distracted by their own misfortunes.   
This was confirmed 7 months later in March 2006 with the disclosure of video footage of a 
White House conversation between President Bush and Homeland Security Secretary 
Michael Chertoff being briefed on 28 August, one day prior to the hurricane’s arrival.  From 
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the conversation it appears that Bush had already decided that property was to take higher 
priority than potential loss of life.   
‘I want to assure the folks at the state level that we are fully prepared to not 
only help you during the storm, but we will move in whatever resources and 
assets we have at our disposal after the storm to help you deal with the loss of 
property,’ Bush says in one part of the video.  ‘We pray there’s no loss of life, 
of course.’ 
(Jones, 2006, n.p.) 
By presencing the crisis as a property issue the concretisation that ensued saw leaders enact 
decisions to protect their power base, but with little reference to those bearing the brunt of the 
disaster.  The three aesthetic elements of form and content, backward reflexivity, and myth 
making provide a frame for an investigation on how the disaster was managed. 
The continual interaction of form and content allows for creative and innovative solutions to 
be applied to problem situations.  However, where either form or content dominate, a 
nihilistic tendency towards closure and finality occurs, thereby stymieing creativity.  The 
dominance of form sees macro structures taking priority over micro needs; whereas when 
content is more evident, rigorous application of idiosyncratic ideology overrides the need to 
see the wider implications of that belief.  
In New Orleans rescue efforts became hamstrung because of an inability of various agencies 
to decide which one bore responsibility for managing the crisis.  Was the Federal Emergency 
Management Agency (FEMA) to take charge, or would responsibility lie with Florida State 
authorities?  Unwilling to cede power, neither federal nor local bodies were able to 
coordinate their efforts.  This led to ‘uncertainty about who was in charge at crucial 
moments’ ("4 places where the system broke down," 2005, p. 48).  The inability of agencies 
to look beyond their patch to solve a greater need saw the triumph of form over content.  
Hence, the tendency to protect existing structures and lines of control which were useful 
under normal conditions now became dysfunctional; and the urgent requirement to respond to 
the immediate needs of the homeless and destitute (content) became subsumed under the 
desire to keep existing management structures in place (form).   
This was also seen in a federal administration wedded to fixed leadership arrangements.  
Reporter Mike Allen quoting a White House Adviser writes: ‘The extremely highly 
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centralized control of the government — the engine of Bush’s success — failed him this 
time’ (Allen, 2005, p. 34).  Being unable to respond to the crisis of the moment by remaining 
fixed to a given process is further reflected in a comment by Republican Congressman for 
New Orleans, Bobby Jindal: ‘The bureaucracy needs to do more than one thing at a time’ 
(Cooper, 2005, p. 43).  Jindal’s critique advocated that managing this crisis necessitated 
leaders to think polyphonically and to possess the persuasive ability to bring bureaucratic 
functions in line with the immediate requirements that the chaotic environment presented.  By 
being captured by form over content, the Federal Government was unable to respond quickly 
to new situations.   
Not only did form triumph over content at national level, leaders were also emasculated at 
local level, unable to release much needed funds for fear of the consequences.  A Time 
account claims: ‘Leaders were afraid to actually lead, reluctant to cost businesses money, 
break jurisdictional rules or spawn lawsuits’ ("4 places where the system broke down," 2005, 
p. 48).  Ironically, by leaders protecting existing positions and roles, a collapse of appropriate 
leadership ensued. 
And yet the general populace showed a willingness to innovate in the face of the crisis by 
being able to look beyond their long-held ideologies, and offer succor to individuals and 
families with contrary belief systems and lifestyles.  In Arkansas a website, 
openyourhome.com, was created by a private citizen to match the homeless with host 
families.  Through this private initiative, Amanda Ripley reports of a ‘conservative retiree’ 
hosting a ‘lesbian couple and their family’ (Ripley, 2005a, p. 23), an arrangement, that under 
normal conditions would have violated the values of both families, and yet was set to 
continue until the displaced couple found work and were able to resettle.  Here at this micro 
level, people were able to allow the needs of the moment to inform their behaviour, thus 
allowing the form of long-held belief systems to been reshaped by the content embodied in 
the needs of the moment.   
In addition, one of the questions commentators keep returning to is why authorities were so 
unprepared to deal with the crisis in spite of knowing well in advance the probable extent of 
the devastation.  The skill of backward reflexivity responds to this question.  Backward 
reflexivity offers leaders the ability to see the present in terms of the past and to anticipate 
future directions; a skill that could have enabled leaders to be better prepared for the 
inevitability of the disaster and to respond more appropriately when it occurred.   
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Over a year before the disaster in July 2004, City officials had participated in a computer 
simulated hurricane code-named Hurricane Pam.  This virtual recreation based on 
accumulated past experience going back as far as the devastating floods of 1927, accurately 
predicted the outcomes played out in real time 13 months later (NOVA, 2005).  Similarly, in 
her first account from New Orleans, Amanda Ripley also claims that computer modeling had 
predicted the kind of devastation that would most likely result from flooding.  All the studies 
agreed, the levees that kept water away from a city built below sea level would not hold.   
Their elaborate computer models showed that tens of thousands would be left 
behind.  They described rooftop rescues, 80% of New Orleans underwater and 
‘toxic gumbo’ purling through the streets.  If experts had prophesied a terrorist 
attack with that kind of accuracy, they would be under suspicion for treason. 
(Ripley, 2005b, p. 28) 
Previous experiences of disasters in the Florida region had taught emergency administrators 
that immediate response is crucial, which is why Ripley reports that disaster coordinators 
needed to be immediately present and visible.  She quotes a former director of disaster relief 
saying, ‘If you are not visible within 72 hours, you will have chaos’ (Ripley, 2005b, p. 33).  
Visibility reassures victims that agencies are being active and responsive thereby protecting 
them against the possible spread of anarchy.   
With the benefits of computer modeling and past experience, what could account for the 
inability of the disaster relief agencies swinging into immediate action?  I argue that key 
decision makers lacked the skill of backward reflexivity.  As the term reflexive implies, this is 
a spontaneous act that seeks to make sense of the present in the light of the past, and then 
intuitively anticipate the future based on these evaluations.  In this way gut feel works closely 
alongside the rational view championed by the scientific approach.   
My analysis is made with the benefit of hindsight.  What, though, would an aesthetician do in 
immediate response to the crisis?  An aesthetically alert leader is conscious of the shift from 
how an issue is presenced, its intentional construction; and the way it is concretised, or read, 
by those observing the action.  Pleas for help by people housed in the New Orleans 
Superdome and trapped on the freeway above the high water line, offered a cue to those 
managing the crisis of the need to change focus from protecting property to saving lives.   
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Such a shift required attention to both the macro and micro levels of disaster management.  
Therefore coordinating the agencies and finding means of immediately attending to the 
suffering of those left un-housed on the freeway necessitated an ability to improvise and 
make decisions based on solving immediate problems.  In all the efforts of agencies to act 
proactively, it seems that rescue efforts lacked an attending mythology to galvanise public 
opinion and garner support from the rest of the nation.   
By comparison, in response to the terrorist attacks on the World Trade Centre in September 
2001, now euphemistically termed ‘9/11’, leaders quickly created a mythology as a political 
tool.  The spuriously named ‘War on Terror’ has since become the rallying cry to animate the 
public and politicians alike in the call for greater security and vigilance.  And yet 
sophisticated technologies that can predict and determine the effects of hurricanes did not 
awaken the imagination of leaders sufficient to overcome their fear of acting outside the 
script.  The problem is that the Florida public did not believe they were at risk from the 
approaching hurricane in the same way the general populace feel vulnerable to terrorism.  
Ironically, where the adversary is invisible, leaders are able to create a mythology to 
manipulate public opinion, but when the threat is known and understood, it is much harder to 
exert control.  For:  
In times of war or crisis, power is easily stolen from the many by the few on a 
promise of security.  The more elusive or imaginary the foe, the better for 
manufacturing consent.   
(Wright, 2005, p. 49) 
Within the frame of the three aesthetic elements of form and content, backward reflexivity 
and myth making, I have examined the flawed management of the Katrina crisis.  As noted, 
this analysis has been with the benefit of hindsight.  How, though, could the aesthetic lens 
help leaders secure the future of New Orleans and avoid future devastations?  
KATRINA: MANAGING AESTHETICALLY  
As argued in the introduction, aesthetics complements instrumentality and ethics.  Hence 
acting efficiently and doing justly are added to by acting beautifully.  Rather than being 
confined to works of art hung in a gallery or performed in a concert hall, aesthetics impacts 
elements of everyday life.  How, then, do leaders behave aesthetically? 
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I have argued that the ways in which organisations behave is in many ways determined by the 
ways in which leaders intentionally presence their ideas.  Intentionality, which in this study is 
synonymous with presencing, guides the ways in which leaders communicate with others.  
Taking this line, a leader’s rhetoric is derived from the ways in which they conceive of a 
problem in their imagination.  This intentionality determines the ways in which subordinates 
will concretise and enact a leader’s rhetoric.  
By intentionally reframing the New Orleans disaster as one of saving life rather than 
property, a new set of problems become the focus.  Taking this line, leaders would 
acknowledge that property can be restored and infrastructure repaired, but human lives are 
irreplaceable.  By shifting the spotlight off property and on to people the aesthetician-leader 
is then able to actively work towards supporting the populace through the disaster.   
With people as the primary focus, resources could be quickly applied to evacuation, rescue 
and resettlement.  This, then, sees form – leadership structures – take shape around content – 
the need to save lives.  Hence the tendency for agencies and individuals to vie for dominance 
and control is mitigated by the pre-eminent need to offer people security and safety.   
Beyond the issue of who has ultimate responsibility are the complexities of the legal 
structures within which agencies operate in the USA.  In 2005, fear of litigation became an 
obstacle to taking urgent and immediate action.  When the legal system ceases to serve the 
needs of the citizens it is trying to protect, then the form within which the system operates 
needs to be changed.  But to make such dramatic changes requires leaders with the political 
will and creativity to advocate for those who suffer the most from the consequences of such 
disasters.   
The notion of backward reflexivity allows for leaders to not only see events within their 
context, but also to anticipate future possibilities.  For about the past 100 years the Florida 
marsh lands have gradually been drained in order to provide for an insatiable hunger for land 
in the region.  This has robbed the area of its natural defences against tidal fluctuations.  In 
the past the marshes have acted like a large soak holes defending the coast line against the 
tidal surges that hurricanes bring.  It seems that reclamation process should immediately be 
reversed and the area returned to its natural state, if further flooding of New Orleans is to be 
avoided.  This will, of course, outrage those who have vested interests in continuing to drain 
the swamps.  However, to consider needs of a few over the greater good is a flawed approach.  
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To treat the reclamations as a commodity for agriculture or domestic settlement ignores both 
the immediate needs of the inhabitants of New Orleans and the long term costs that are likely 
to be incurred by future potential disasters that occur during the annual hurricane season.   
Finally, how might mythology help leaders garner support for rebuilding the destroyed 
suburbs?  As I have noted above, a myth is ideology couched as a story.  Bruce Lincoln 
argues that myth is used by leaders in order to cement their ideologies in the peoples’ hearts 
and minds.  Hence he argues that myth is ‘speech of power, performed at length, in public, by 
one in a position of authority’ (Lincoln, 1999, p. 17).   
The failure of leaders to act promptly and appropriately belied the mythology surrounding 
New Orleans, the home of jazz.  From an aesthetic point of view, the tragedy of the disaster 
was that leaders could not translate the fundamentals of this artistic form and deploy the 
essence of jazz to help them solve their dilemmas.  Improvisation, attention to the sound 
(pleas for help) of others in the New Orleans ensemble, and allowing the established form to 
evolve around new ideas, could have provided a symbolic frame from which to make sense of 
the chaotic environment.  Furthermore New Orleans as the cradle of the USA’s effervescence 
could be the narrative that galvanises the whole nation to rebuild the city to its former glory. 
CONCLUSION 
New Orleans — the Big Easy, ‘America’s Soul Kitchen’ (Marsalis, 2005) — experienced 
devastation because of a natural disaster made worse by leaders unable to activate their 
aesthetic sensibilities.  By presencing the disaster as the protection of property over saving 
life, the disaster became concretised as a struggle between agencies.  The form of leadership 
took preeminence over the need to improvise and to make decisions on the fly.  Where 
deploying the spontaneous skill of backward reflexivity, and developing a mythology to 
captivate the popular imagination could have helped save the city from experiencing the 
extremities of the disaster that overtook it, instead leadership inaction set the scene for the 
disaster to escalate. 
Whether the organisation has a governmental, business, or social function, aesthetic 
considerations will enable leaders to improve decision making.  Not only are efficiency and 
moral values important guides to making enterprises successful, so too are issues derived 
from artistic practice.  Following Foucault’s determination that our individual lives could be 
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works of art, so to our organisations.  This requires organisational actors who are able to act 
creatively, responding to the needs of the moment and behaving in ways that enhance the 
beauty of our communities.  
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